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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
The following abbreviations are sometimes hereinafter 
used: 
1. American — Defendant/Respondent American Savings 
and Loan Association. 
2. Dakal — Plaintiff/Appellant Dakalf Inc. 
3. Diversified — Plaintiff/Appellant Dakal, Inc. 
4. Peck — Mr. Wayne Peck. 
5. Pentelute — Mr. Brad Pentelute. 
6. Liston — Defendant Mark Engar Liston. 
7. Rydalch — Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch. 
8. Rydalches — Defendants Douglas F. Rydalch and his 
wife, Joan Rydalch. 
9. U.C.A. (1953, as amended) — Utah Code Annotated 
10. F/F refers to the numbered paragraph of the Find-
ings of Fact portion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law rendered by the trial court. 
11. Tr , L refers to the page and line of the 
Reporter's Transcript of Hearing held before the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick on April 19, 1984. 
12. TC refers to the page of the Memorandum Deci-
sion rendered by the trial court on May 30, 1984. 
13. OR refers to the page of the Official Record. 
14. Ex. refers to the respective exhibit received 
into evidence at the hearing held before the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick on April 19f 1984. Unless otherwise stated, 
any reference to "Defendant's Ex.w refers to an exhibit 
offered by Defendant American Savings and Loan Association. 
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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This case is before the Court on a Writ of Certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction to review the 
Court of Appeals' decision in this matter is conferred upon 
the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(a) 
and (5)f and by Rule 42 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court as follows: 
U.C.A. 78-2-2. (3) The Supreme Court has appel-
late jurisdiction/ including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals/ over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
U.C.A. 78-2-2. (5) The Supreme Court has sole 
discretion in granting or denying a petition for 
writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of 
Appeals adjudication/ ... 
RULE 42. R. Utah S. Ct. 
Unless otherwise provided by lawf the 
review of a judgment/ an orderf and a decree 
(herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court 
of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a 
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this matter is 
Diversified Equities/ Inc.f a Utah corporation/ and Dakal/ 
Inc./ a Utah corporation/ v. American Savings and Loan Associ-
ation/ et al.f 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987). A copy of the 
opinion is included in the Appendix hereto. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in not according 
the trial court1s opinion proper deference? 
2. Were Plaintiffs bona fide purchasers of the real 
property which is the subject matter of the instant lawsuit? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The controlling statutes in this case are U.C.A. 57-1-6 
(1953, as amended) and U.C.A. 57-3-3 (1953f as amended), both 
statutes being set forth in full hereinafter in the Appendix 
on Exhibit 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking to quiet title 
to real property in Diversified, subject to an equitable lien 
in favor of Dakal (OR 2-11). In the original action, Defen-
dant American Savings and Loan Association filed a counter-
claim against the Plaintiffs alleging that Plaintiffs were 
not bona fide purchasers of the property and have been unjust-
ly enriched at American's expense (OR 161-163). Originally 
American also filed a cross-claim against Defendant Mark 
Engar Liston alleging that he was still liable to American on 
the Note and Deed of Trust he assumed when he (Liston) pur-
chased the property (OR 233-235) . In addition, American 
filed a third-party complaint against Third Party Defendant 
Douglas F. Rydalch alleging that Rydalch was unjustly 
enriched at American's expense (OR 219-228). 
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The trial court concluded that neither of the Plain-
tiffs were bona fide purchasers of the property (TC 8), even 
though it quieted title to the property in Plaintiff Dakal, 
Inc. subject to an equitable lien in favor of American 
Savings and Loan Association for the amount of unpaid princi-
pal and arrearages due and owing (TC 10) . The trial court 
also found that the Defendant Rydalch was unjustly enriched 
at the expense of Dakal in the amount of $37
 f980, the sale 
price of the property (TC 11). 
The trial court also terminated the rights and/or 
liabilities of Defendant Mark Engar Liston to the property 
and dismissed American's claims against him (TC 12). 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
ruling and remanded with instructions to quiet title to Dakal 
and/or Diversified, as their interests may appear, as against 
American Savings and Loan Association. Diversified Equities 
at 1137. 
The Utah Supreme Court granted as prayed American 
Savings and Loan Association's Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari. 
Even though defendant American Savings and Loan Associ-
ation was the respondent to plaintiffs' appeal before the 
Utah Court of Appeals, said defendant American Savings and 
Loan Association is now before the Utah Supreme Court as an 
"appellant" and plaintiffs are now "respondents" before the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 27, 1978, Defendant and respondent 
American Savings and Loan Association made a loan to Donald 
J. and Karen H. Bailey in the sum of $59f200, which loan was 
evidenced by a Promissory Note and a Deed of Trust (F/F lf Tr 
7 L 3-7f Defendant's Exs. 23 & 24). The real property (here-
inafter "property") described in said Deed of Trust is Lot 
41, Tamlee Village, and is located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
The Deed of Trust was dated January 27, 1978, and recorded 
February 2, 1978, in the records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office (F/F 1 and 2, Defendant's Ex. 24). 
In October, 1980, the Baileys sold the property to Mark 
Engar Liston who assumed the Baileys' loan with American upon 
American's approval by executing a Mortgage Loan Assumption 
Agreement, a Modification Agreement, and a Waiver of Deed of 
Trust Non-Assumption Agreement. In the documentation signed 
by Liston when he assumed the above-described loan, the Deed 
of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement was waived specifically and 
exclusively for the conveyance from Bailey to Liston, but the 
Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement did remain in effect 
as to subsequent sales (F/F 3 & 4, Defendant's Exs. 25, 26 & 
27) . 
On May 14, 1982, Liston gave to M & W Enterprises a 
Warranty Deed conveying the property (which was subsequently 
recorded) without the approval or knowledge of American, even 
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though the property was still subject to American1s Trust 
Deed (F/F 5, Tr 7 L 17-20, Defendants Ex. 31). 
On May 28/ 1982, without American's knowledge or appro-
val/ M & W Enterprises sold the property to Defendant Douglas 
F. Rydalch and his wifef Joan Rydalch (F/F 6). The Warranty 
Deed conveying the property from M & W Enterprises to the 
Rydalches, however, expressly stated that the property was 
subject to American1s Trust Deed to secure payment of a note 
in the sum of $59,200 (F/F 7, Tr 11 L 5-9, Defendant's Ex. 
38) . M & W Enterprises also executed a Transfer and Assign-
ment of Reserve Account which assigned and transferred to the 
Rydalches all amounts held by American for Payment of taxes 
and insurance on the property (F/F 10, Defendant's Ex. 36). 
The Buyer's Escrow Instructions, which were executed by 
the Rydalches, also expressly stated that the property was 
subject to American's Trust Deed and also subject to the Deed 
of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement, thus requiring the written 
approval of American prior to any sale or transfer of the 
property (F/F 8, Defendant's Ex. 35). The closing officer at 
Stewart Title Company further indicated that she very care-
fully explained to the Rydalches that the property was sub-
ject to American's Deed of Trust (F/F 12, Tr 10 L 19-23). 
The Rydalches also executed an Indemnification and 
Waiver Agreement for Non-Assumption Clause in which they 
acknowledged that Stewart Title Company, the escrow and 
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closing agent, had informed them of the existence of 
American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that the Rydalches 
would hold harmless and indemnify Stewart Title Company for 
any consequences resulting from the failure to obtain written 
approval from American prior to the transfer of the property 
(F/F 9, Defendant's Ex. 37). Based upon an appraisal of the 
property by Academy Appraisal Associates, the Rydalches 
received a title insurance policy from Stewart Title Company 
in the amount of $103,000. Schedule B of said policy clearly 
states that the policy itself did not insure against any loss 
by reason of American's Deed of Trust and Non-Assumption 
Agreement (F/F 11, Defendant's Ex. 40). 
So that he might purchase the property from M & W 
Enterprises, Rydalch borrowed $18,000 from Herb Holzer (who 
took a note for $19,080) on the basis that M & W Enterprises' 
principal, Roy Miller, would repay the loan within 30 days 
from the time Rydalch borrowed the money (Tr 9 L 13-25, Tr 65 
L 5-14, Rydalches1 Exs. 9, 10 & 11). Roy Miller disappeared 
after the sale from M & W Enterprises to Rydalch and has not 
been available to repay the $19,080 note he originally agreed 
to pay (Tr 10 L 2-8) . 
After the sale of the property to him and after Roy 
Miller's nonpayment, Rydalch, in attempting to sell the 
property tried to determine what liens were still against it 
(Tr 12 L 9-11) . He then went to his attorney, Mr. Burnett, 
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and together they tried to determine what liens were still 
outstanding against the property. Mr. Burnett learned that 
one of the liens on the property had already been paid off 
(Tr 12 L 12-21). Rydalch and his attorney called American 
three times. While the first call was inconclusive/ the last 
two calls mistakenly indicated that American's loan had been 
paid off (Tr 13 L 17-18; Tr 14 L 4-8). 
In response to the telephone callsf American mistakenly 
released its Trust Deed on the property by reconveyance which 
was recorded on December 9, 1982 (F/F 13, Tr 14 L 8-14f 
Defendant's Ex. 41). 
The reason for American's error was that there was 
confusion with its accounting system because the Baileys had 
taken out more than 34 loans with said institution (Tr 14 L 
20-23). 
In the meantime, Herb Holzer began threatening Rydalch 
and his family with bodily harm if Rydalch did not repay the 
loan even though Rydalch had given Holzer a trust deed to the 
property (Tr 15 L22-25). 
Near the first of January 1983f Rydalch responded to a 
newspaper advertisment which had been placed by Brad Pente-
lute, a self-described mortgage broker who specialized in 
distressed sales (Tr 16 L 21-25f Tr 17 L 1-6). Rydalch met 
with Pentelute, described his need to sell the property and 
presented to Pentelute a copy of his title insurance which 
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reflected American's interest in the property (Tr 17 L 7-15f 
Defendant's Ex. 40). Rydalch and attorney Burnett both 
assured Pentelute that American's lien had been satisfied and 
attorney Burnett gave Pentelute a copy of the reconveyance 
issued by mistake by American (Tr 17 L 16-24, Defendant's Ex. 
41). Pentelute called American and was told that the obliga-
tion on the property had been paid (Tr 18 L 15-20). 
The Trust Deed in favor of American which had not been 
paid, and for which American erroneously gave a reconveyance, 
continues to be unpaid (F/F 14) and as of May 3f 1984, the 
total remaining unpaid principal balance owed to American 
under its Trust Deed was the sum of $56,742.92 and the arrear-
ages under said Trust Deed (which total $15,886.00) consisted 
of principal in the sum of $1,283.60, interest in the sum of 
$12,626.12 and reserve account in the sum of $1,956.28 (F/F 
14). 
Brad Pentelute arranged the sale of the property from 
the Rydalches to Dakal in behalf of Dakal and Wayne Peck (F/F 
22, Tr 19 L 3-10). According to the trial court's findings, 
Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal and Wayne 
Peck, who was the President and principal executive officer 
of both Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of 
the property from Third Party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff 
Dakal, Inc. (F/F 23). 
-8-
The trial court further found that both Brad Pentelute 
and Wayne Peck had substantial experience and dealings with 
distressed properties and real estate transactions in general, 
both were aware of the approximate market value of the pro-
perty and Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the 
property at the time the Rydalches acquired the property from 
M & W Enterprises (F/F 27). Also, Wayne Peck paid a finder's 
fee in the sum of $14,000 to Brad Pentelute for arranging the 
property's purchase by Dakal (F/F 29 and Tr 19 L 6-8). 
On January 21, 1983, for the sum of $37
 f 980 (with 
$21,840 going to Herb Holzer and $16,140 to the Rydalches), 
the Rydalches sold the subject property to Plaintiff Dakal, 
Inc. which on the same day, sold the property to Plaintiff 
Diversified Equitiesf Inc. for the sum of $60,000 (F/F 18 and 
Tr 20 L 4-12). Incidentally, Mr. Holzer paid Mr. Pentalute a 
fee in the additional sum of $2,000 for acting as his inter-
mediary in getting his (Holzer's) money (Tr 23 L 19-23). 
The property was sold by the Rydalches to Dakal for 
approximately one-half or less of its market value (F/F 28, 
Tr 11 L 22, 24-25, Tr 12 L 1-2), and Dakal paid the closing 
costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches to Dakal (F/F 30, 
Plaintiff's Ex. 5) . 
On February 17, 1983, American recorded its Affidavit 
indicating that the Trust Deed, described hereinabove, had 
been released by mistake (F/F 16). 
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According to the trial court's findingsf consequentlyf 
it is clear that the Rydalches either knew or certainly 
should have known that their obligation to American had not 
been paid since they had not done so and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake 
(F/F 17, Defendant's Ex. 45). 
The trial court further found that Wayne Peek, insofar 
as the facts and events regarding the conveyances of the 
property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Dakalf Inc., 
and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities, Inc., are 
concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diversified 
Equities (F/F 21). 
The trial court's findings stated that Brad Pentelute 
and/or Wayne Peck had more than sufficient information to 
necessitate a further inquiry into whether Rydalch had actu-
ally satisfied the obligation to American and whether American 
had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on the pro-
perty (F/F 24) . 
According to the trial court, such an inquiry would 
have, in all probability, led to the discovery that while the 
Rydalches, and no one else, had the obligation to pay Ameri-
can's loan, neither the Rydalches nor anyone else had paid 
American and that American's release of its Trust Deed was, 
in fact, a mistake (F/F 25). 
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The trial court also stated that, in addition, Brad 
Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck knew or should have known that 
something was amiss regarding the Rydalches1 representation 
of their fee simple ownership of the property. Supporting 
facts include the "distress" sale of the property by the 
Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less of its 
market value, the $14f000 finder's fee paid to Brad Pentelute 
by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase price by Dakal of 
$37,980, and the same-day transfer of the property from Dakal 
to Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000 (F/F 26). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
American contends that in its decision of Diversified 
Equities v. American Savings and Loan Association, 739 P.2d 
1133 (Utah App.1987) wherein the Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court, said Court of Appeals decided 
questions of state law in ways that conflict with prior 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. Thus, in so doing, the 
Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision that calls for an 
exercise of the Utah Supreme Court's supervision because said 
decision has departed so far from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings. 
I. The Utah Court of Appeals did not accord the 
trial court's opinion proper deference because even in equity 
actions, the Utah Supreme Court will not disturb the findings 
of fact made below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous 
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or against the weight of evidence. American submits that the 
trial court's findings are not at all erroneous or against 
the weight of evidence let alone "clearly" erroneous or 
against the weight of evidence. 
II. Plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of the 
property because: 
A* They knew that the previous owner, Rydalch, 
had purchased the property subject to American's loan of 
$60,000 and that no one else would have paid American; 
B. Plaintiff paid $37,980 for property which 
had been appraised at $100,000 and Utah case law has held 
that notice may be imputed from the mere fact that the sales 
price was grossly disproportionate to the market value of the 
property; and 
C. A mortgage discharged through mistake will 
ordinarily be regarded in equity as still in existence with 
its original priority as a lien. 
ARGUMENT 
A PANEL OF THE COURT OP APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS 
OF STATE LAW IN WAYS THAT ARE IN CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND IN SO DOING, THE PANEL HAS REN-
DERED A DECISION THAT HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED 
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN 
EXERCISE OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S SUPERVISION. 
-12-
I. THE COURT OP APPEALS DID NOT ACCORD THE TRIAL 
COURT'S OPINION PROPER DEFERENCE. 
The Court of Appeals did not accord the trial court's 
opinion the deference to which it is entitled. Whereas the 
trial court found that Peck and Pentelute were chargeable 
with actual notice (TC 6) and that Diversified and Dakal were 
not bona fide purchasers of the property (TC 8), the Appeals 
Court panel overturned the trial court's decision based upon 
its review of the "stipulated facts." Diversified Equities 
at 1134 & 1136. For example, on page 1136 of its decision, 
the Court of Appeals' panel states that: 
Generally, a trial court's findings of fact are 
accorded great deference. However, without 
regard to the labels used, when those "findings" 
proceed from stipulated facts, as in the instant 
case, the "findings" are tantamount to conclu-
sions of law, with the stipulation of facts being 
the functional equivalent of true findings of 
fact. 
It is important to note, however, that the trial court's 
findings amount to and are based on more than simply "stipu-
lated facts." According to the trial court's preamble to its 
Findings of Fact, more than just "stipulated facts" were 
presented for its review: 
The parties represented at the hearing having 
entered into and presented an oral stipulation of 
facts, agreed to by all the parties so represented, 
and said parties having introduced their respective 
documents which were admitted into evidence, and 
Defendant Mark Engar Liston having presented 
evidence, and the Court having heard and examined 
the evidence, both oral and documentary, introduced 
by the respective parties hereto, and having 
examined the memoranda of counsel, . . . [Emphasis 
added.] 
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At the time this matter was heard by the trial court on 
April 19, 1984, Defendant Mark Engar Liston presented three 
witnesses: himself, his prior attorney Ben Knowlton, and the 
Plaintiffs' principal/ Wayne Peck (Tr 27-63). Thus, the 
trial court had the opportunity to not only review the docu-
mentary evidence, but to observe and judge the demeanor of at 
least two important witnesses as well. 
That the trial court relied on more than just "stipu-
lated facts" is demonstrated by its own statement contained 
in its Memorandum Decision: 
The Court has carefully reviewed the Transcript 
of Stipulation of Facts of April 19, 1984, agreed 
to by all the parties, and has examined all of 
the documentary evidence received, and considered 
the testimony of the witnesses (TC 2). [Emphasis 
added.] 
Thus, the trial court in this case did not simply gloss 
over "stipulated facts." By its own statement, the court 
"carefully" reviewed the Transcript of Stipulation of facts, 
"examined" all of the documentary evidence and "considered" 
the testimony of witnesses (TC 2). 
Certainly an appellate court is not at liberty to 
undertake an independent retrial of all factual issues aris-
ing in a suit in equity... the trial court1s disposition of 
the matter is entitled to a certain deference and should be 
disturbed only where necessary to prevent manifest injustice. 
Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340 (Utah 1980). 
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Further, even in equity actions where it is the Supreme 
Court's responsibility to review evidence as well as law, the 
Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of fact made 
below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous or against 
the weight of evidence. Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658, 660 
(Utah, 1982); McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah, 
1978) . 
In the case of Dang v. Cox Corp., the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that it "will not substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court or disturb the trial court's findings 
of fact when they are based on substantial competent and 
admissible evidence." Dang at 660. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has also stated that it is 
not that court's function to substitute its judgment for that 
of the fact finder, State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 
(Utah App. 1987) , and yet, in the instant case, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has precisely substituted its judgment for 
that of the trial court. Further, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has stated that it will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court nor disturb the trial court's findings of 
fact when they are based on substantial, competent and admis-
sible evidence. Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 
1987). 
In equity cases, the Supreme Court reverses the trial 
court's findings only when the evidence clearly preponderates 
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against them. Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 612 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980); Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980); Parks 
Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 
1982); Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 151-152 (Utah 1981); 
Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981); Provo City v. 
Lambert, 574 P.2d 727 (Utah 1978). This is the same standard 
applied in those cases which state that the Utah Supreme 
Court reverses only when the trial court's finding is against 
the clear weight of the evidence. McBride v. McBride, supra; 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981). 
American submits that as will be shown herein, the 
evidence clearly does not preponderate against the trial 
court's findings. Certainly there was no doubt on the part 
of the trial court wherein the trial court concluded that the 
"evidence, particularly when viewed as a whole, clearly 
establishes that plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of 
the property" (TC 8) [emphasis added]. 
Thus, although the fact findings of a trial judge in an 
equity suit may not be conclusive on appeal, yet a presump-
tion exists in favor of their correctness and they will never 
be lightly disturbed. 5A C.J.S. 589, Appeal & Error §1663. 
The trial court's stated Findings of Fact include the 
following: 
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17. Consequently, it is clear that the 
Rydalches either knew or certainly should have 
known that their obligation to American had not 
been paid since they had not done so and that 
American's release of its Trust Deed on the 
property had to be a mistake. 
18. Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and 
events regarding the conveyances of the property 
from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Dakal, 
Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equi-
ties, Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of 
both Dakal and Diversified Equities. 
24. Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had 
more than sufficient information to necessitate a 
further inquiry into whether Rydalch had actually 
satisfied the obligation to American and whether 
American had made a mistake in releasing its 
Trust Deed on the property. 
26. Such an inquiry would have, in all 
probability, lead to the discovery that while the 
Rydalches, and no one else, had the obligation to 
pay American1s loan, neither the Rydalches nor 
anyone else had paid American and that American1s 
release of its Trust Deed was, in fact, a mis-
take. 
27. In addition, Brad Pentelute and/or 
Wayne Peck knew or should have known that some-
thing was amiss regarding the Rydalches1 represen-
tation of their fee simple ownership of the 
property. Supporting facts include the "dis-
tress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to 
Dakal for approximately one-half or less of its 
market value, the $14,000 finder's fee paid to 
Brad Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the 
purchase price by Dakal of $37,980, and the 
same-day transfer of the property from Dakal to 
Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000. 
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That the above "Findings" are true findings of fact is 
supported by Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah, 1983), 
which indicated that the determination of whether a purchaser 
received actual notice of prior unrecorded interests is a 
question of fact. Johnson at 310. 
In addition, the determination of whether the duty of 
inquiry was satisfied, is also a question of fact. G. Thomp-
son, 8 Thompson on Real Property, §4236 at p. 451 (1963); 
U.S. Fiduciary Corp. v. Loma Vista Associates, 675 P.2d 724, 
728 (Ariz. App. 1983) (whether due inquiry was made is a 
question of fact); Berge v. Fredericks, 591 P.2d 246, 249 
(Nev. 1979) (the question whether due inquiry was made is one 
of fact to be investigated by the jury). 
American submits that the trial court's opinion should 
have been accorded greater deference by the Utah Court of 
Appeals not only because of the trial judge's careful review 
of the stipulated facts and examination of the documentary 
evidence, but the trial court had the advantage of being able 
to observe the demeanor of three witnesses, one of whom, Mr. 
Wayne Peck, is the principal of both plaintiffs in this 
action (Tr 22 L 5-6, Tr 59 L 17-21). 
The importance of the trial court's vantage point in 
this regard is not only recognized by Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure ("...due regard shall be given to 
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the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses") but has been clearly ennunciated by the 
Utah Supreme Court which has stated that "while the Supreme 
Court may review questions of both law and fact in equity 
cases, it is not bound to substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court, and because of the trial court's advantaged 
position, the Supreme Court gives considerable deference to 
its findings and judgment. See Erickson v. Beardall, 20 
Utah 2d 287, 437 P.2d 210 (1968); Etton v. Utah State Retire-
ment Board, 503 P.2d 137 (Utah 1972); Fisher v. Taylor, 572 
P.2d 393 (Utah 1977); Bustamante v. Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40 
(Utah 1982); Nupetco Ass, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 
1983); Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983); Shioji v. 
Shioji, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985); Jeppesen v. Jeppesen, 684 
P.2d 69 (Utah 1984) . 
II. PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT BONA FIDE PURCHASERS OF THE 
PROPERTY. 
A. PLAINTIFFS TOOK THE PROPERTY WITH NOTICE OF 
AMERICAN'S INTEREST. 
American respectfully contends that Plaintiffs were not 
bona fide purchasers of the subject property because they 
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took with notice of American's interest and because of the 
relatively small sum of money paid by Plaintiffs for the 
land. According to Pender v. Dowse, et al.y 1 Utah 2d 283, 
265 P.2d 644 (1954) , in order to be entitled to protection as 
a bona fide purchaser, the purchase must also have been made 
in good faith and a purchase with notice is considered a 
purchase made male fide. Pender at 289. 
The language of U.C.A. 57-1-6 (1953, as amended) which 
statute is set forth in the attached Appendix) indicates that 
a third person takes without notice of an instrument if not 
recorded unless the purchaser has actual notice. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the requirement of "actual 
notice" is satisfied [ilf a party dealing with the land had 
information of facts which would put a prudent man upon 
inquiry and which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge 
as to the state of the title. Johnson v. Bell (supra) at 
310; Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890); McGarry 
v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948). 
It can thus be seen that actual notice in Utah is more 
synonymous with constructive notice in other contexts. In 
the Utah cases of McGarry v. Thompsony 114 Utah 442, 451, 201 
P.2d 288 (1948) , Universal C.I.T. Corporation v. Courtesy 
Motors, 8 Utah 2d 275, 333 P.2d 628, 629 (1959) the Utah 
Supreme Court noted with approval that: 
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[Wlhatever is notice enough to excite attention 
and put the party on his guard and call for 
inquiry is notice of everything to which such 
inquiry might have led* When a person has suf-
ficient information to lead him to a fact, he 
shall be deemed conversant of it. Id. at 451. 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that it is 
notice, not knowledge, that the purchaser must have, and it 
need not be actual notice - constructive notice is sufficient 
to defeat the purchaser's claim. Constructive notice can 
occur when circumstances arise that should put a reasonable 
person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part. 
Meyer v. General American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Utah 
1977) . Thus, under Utah law, when notice of something is 
enough to excite a reasonable man's attention and put him on 
inquiry, it is notice of everything to which such inquiry 
might lead. O'Reilly v. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770, 
775 (1934); Peterson v. United States, 511 F.Supp. 250, 257 
(CD. Utah 1981) . 
American submits that Plaintiffs, by and through Pente-
lute and Peck, had more than enough information to excite 
their attention and put them on their guard and call for 
inquiry so that they had notice of everything to which such 
inquiry might have led, i.e., that neither the Rydalches nor 
anyone else had paid American's loan and the Trust Deed had 
been released by mistake. 
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Pentelute, who acted as the agent for the Plaintiffs, 
was aware of American's lien as evidenced by the information 
he received from Rydalch and Rydalch's attorney, Mr. Burnett, 
which included documents in Mr. Burnett's possession and a 
copy of the title insurance policy received by Rydalch at the 
time he purchased the property, said copy showing American's 
lien but not showing an existing lien of Beehive Thrift & 
Loan. (Tr 17-18, Defendant's Ex. 40). 
Further, both Pentelute and Peck had substantial exper-
ience and dealings with distresed properties and real estate 
transactions in general and both were aware of the approxi-
mate market value of the property. (Tr 16-19, F/F 27). 
Other facts and events which support the conclusion 
that Pentelute and/or Peck knew or should kave known that 
something was amiss regarding the Rydalches' representation 
of their fee simple ownership of the property include the 
"distress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to Dakal for 
approximately one-half or less of its market value (Tr 11-12, 
15, 19), the $14,000.00 finders fee paid to Pentelute by Peck 
compared to the purchase price by Dakal of $37,980.00 (Tr 
19-21) , and the same-day transfer of the property from Dakal 
to Diversified by Peck for $60,000.00 (Tr 20-21, Plaintiff's 
Exs. 2, 6). 
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All of the above-mentioned evidence, particularly when 
viewed as a wholef clearly establishes that Dakal and Diver-
sified were not bona fide purchasers of the property under 
Utah statutory and case law (TC 7-8). 
Pentelute represented himself as a mortgage broker and 
was in the business of reviewing and finding distress sales 
and has reviewed hundreds of possible transactions with the 
objective of buying distressed properties. As an experienced 
and sophisticated dealer with real property, he should then 
have been aware that with Rydalch as the fee simple title 
holder, no one else would have had an obligation, let alone 
the inclination, to pay American's loan. Pentelute, as 
Plaintiffs' agent, after having been made aware of American's 
interest in the property, had a duty to ascertain whether or 
not Rydalch had satisfied American's obligation by paying it. 
By not making said determination, the Plaintiffs cannot now 
represent that they took the property without notice of 
American's interest. 
The evidence and facts submitted to the trial court 
provide clear, persuasive and compelling support for the 
trial court's finding that Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal 
did have actual notice of American's interest. The evidence, 
when viewed as a whole, is unequivocally sufficient notice to 
"excite attention" and "put a prudent man upon inquiry." 
Evidence is considered sufficient to support a trial court's 
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findings if it depicts circumstances sufficient to infer 
those findings. Pixton v. Dunnf 120 Utah 638, 238 P.2d 408 
(1951) . Reasonable inferences drawn from the facts of the 
instant above clearly support the trial court's decision. 
Common sense and the Plaintiffs1 knowledge of the real 
estate market would undoubtedly have alerted Plaintiffs to 
the irregularities regarding the subject property. They knew 
that Rydalch had purchased the property subject to almost 
$60,000 worth of indebtedness. Plaintiffs knewf or should 
have known, that no one else would have paid American. 
Plaintiffs knew or should have known that a $60,000 encum-
brance would not disappear, in the space of six months, into 
thin air. The repeated phone calls and conversations concern-
ing American's release of its Trust Deed evidence that Plain 
tiffs themselves were highly suspicious of that transaction. 
When the evidence is viewed as a whole with the inferences 
that must logically be drawn therefrom, it is clear that 
Plaintiffs had actual notice of American's interest and the 
mistake which had inadvertently been made. Therefore, Plain-
tiffs cannot be accorded the status of bona fide purchasers. 
B. UTAH CASE LAW PROVIDES THAT DISPROPORTIONATE SALES 
PRICE TO PROPERTY MARKET VALUE MAY PUT PURCHASER ON NOTICE. 
Notice may be imputed from the mere fact that the sales 
price was grossly disproportionate to the market value of the 
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property. It is well established Utah law that a grossly 
disproportionate sales price may, of itself, be enough to put 
a purchaser on notice of a prior unrecorded interest. In 
Lawley v. Hickenlooperf 61 Ut. 298, 212 Pac. 526 (1922), the 
Supreme Court cited with approval Section 39 Cyc 1718: 
Where the contract under which the purchaser buys 
is sufficient on its face to put him on inquiry 
as to what consideration was or where it plainly 
shows consideration has not been paid or per-
formed, he is chargeable with notice thereof. A 
nominal or a grossly inadequate consideration 
recited in a deed is a sufficient circumstance, 
for a reasonable time after such deed is made and 
recorded, to put a purchaser on inquiry. Lawley 
at 530. [Emphasis added.] 
The position adopted by the Utah court in Lawley is 
consistent with the postition of the Restatement of the Law 
on Restitution: 
The transfer is for value although the consider-
ation is of less value than the property trans-
ferred. The difference in value, however, may be 
evidence that the transferee had notice that the 
transferor held the property subject to an equity 
in favor of another. Restatement of Restitution, 
Section 173, Comment b. 
In Meyer v. General American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 
1977), the purchaser of a caterpillar testified that he 
bought it because of its low price and knew that a cater-
pillar sold for a much higher value. According to the Utah 
Supreme Court this circumstance alone is sufficient to put 
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the purchaser on notice that the transaction may be tainted 
and that other parties are likely to be involved. Meyer at 
1097. 
According to U.C.A. 57-3-3 (1953 as amended), "every 
conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall not be 
recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as against 
any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof 
where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded. Thus, 
in order to prevail, Plaintiffs must show that they were 
subsequent purchasers in good faith and for value. The land 
which is the subject matter of this suit at the time it was 
purchased by the Plaintiffs had been appraised as having a 
market value of $100,000 (Tr 11 L 21-22, Defendant's Ex. 39), 
and yet Plaintiff Dakal purchased the land for a meager 
$37,980 (Tr 20 L 11-12, Plaintiff's Ex. 5). 
In the case of Pender v. Bird, 119 Utah 91 224 P.2d 
1057, (1957), the Supreme Court of Utah held that the record-
ing statute was not enacted to protect one whose ignorance of 
the title is deliberate and intentional nor does a mere 
nominal consideration satisfy the requirement that valuable 
consideration must be paid, but the purpose of the statute is 
to protect one who honestly believes he is acquiring good 
title and who invests some substantial sum in reliance on 
that belief. American contends that by Plaintiff Dakal only 
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paying a little more than one-half of the lowest appraised 
value of the property that such a small payment casts great 
doubt upon Plaintiffs1 stated beliefs that they were acquir-
ing good title. See also Wisconsin River Land Company v. 
Selover, 135 Wis. 594, 116 N.W. 265, 267; Beach v. Faust, 2 
Cal 2d 290, 40 P.2d 822; and Warden v. Windotte Sav. Bank, 47 
Cal. App. 2d, 352, 117 P.2d 910. 
Further in the case of Philips v. Latham, 523 S.W. 2d 
19 (1975) , the court held that although good faith does not 
necessarily require payment of the full value of the pro-
perty, a purchaser who pays a grossly inadequate price cannot 
be considered a good-faith purchaser for value. 
C. MORTGAGE DISCHARGED BY MISTAKE ORDINARILY REGARDED 
AS STILL IN EXISTENCE. 
In deciding this matter the Court of Appeals also 
disregarded the rule that a mortgage discharged through 
mistake will ordinarily be regarded in equity as still in 
existence. In the case of Mills v. Mills, 305 P.2d 61 
(Calif. 1956), the Court reiterated a general and applicable 
principle of law when it stated, "the court of equity will 
keep alive or restore a lien where the equities of the case 
require it and the parties intended that it should not be 
extinguished as where it has been discharged by fraud or 
mistake. Mills at 69-70. 
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In the case of Drake Lumber Co, v. Semple, 130 S. 577 
(Fla. 1930), through the unconscious mistake of a bank teller, 
a note and mortgage were marked "paid" and extinguished, the 
Supreme Court of Florida elaborated on the equitable ques-
tions involved stating, "a court of equity will keep an 
encumbrance alive, or consider it extinguished, as will best 
serve the purpose of justice, and the actual and just inten-
tion of the party; and a mortgage discharged through mistake 
will ordinarily be regarded in equity as still in existence." 
Finally, in the case of Kern v. Hottaling Co., 40 
P.168, 27 OR. 205 (1895), the Supreme Court of Oregon was 
also faced with the situation where a mortgage was mistakenly 
cancelled. Kern sued Hottaling to have the cancellation of 
the mortgage set aside and to have the same reinstated. The 
Supreme Court of Oregon, in granting Kern's request, stated, 
"...the mortgage released through mistake may be restored in 
equity, and given its original priority as a lien." Kern at 
169. 
By cancelling American1s reconveyance and restoring its 
equitable lien, this Court would be consistent with Thompson 
on Real Property, 667, Payment and Discharge of Mortgages, 
Section 4813, which indicates that a release, satisfaction or 
discharge of a mortgage by fraud or made through mistake may 
be cancelled if other parties, having no notice of the fraud, 
[mistake] have not in the meantime acquired an interest in 
the property". Plaintiffs had notice of American's mistake. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, American's Trust Deed was mistaken 
ly reconveyed. The underlying obligation was not, and has 
not been satisfied. Plaintiffs had notice of American's 
mistake and equity therefore requires that the Plaintiffs 
take the property subject to American's lien. American 
therefore contends that the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in 
this matter is in conflict with decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court (see Dangy McBridef Pender v. Dowse and McGarryy supra) 
because the Court of Appeals not only disturbed the Findings 
of Fact made by the trial court which clearly was in the best 
position to make said findings, but also failed to hold that 
plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers of the real pro-
perty. American respectfully submits that the trial court's 
findings were not erroneous, let alone "clearly erroneous," 
or against the weight of evidence. 
In footnote 5 on page 1137 of its opinion of this case, 
the Court of Appeals avers that: 
It would stretch the notion of inquiry notice 
beyond the breaking point to hold that the answer 
Pentelute received to his inquiry of American 
should have prompted him to go further. What 
should he have done? 
Diversified Equitites at 1137. 
In answer to its own question, the Appellate Court 
ignored the obvious answer which is that Pentelute should 
-29-
have informed American that even though the record indicated 
that American had released its lien, the question remained as 
to whether the release had been executed by mistake because 
Pentelute possessed information which suggested that the loan 
had not been paid. 
Based upon the above, American respectfully submits 
that the Court of Appeals has rendered an opinion which 
conflicts with prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and 
in so doing has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings that this Honorable Court 
should reverse the Court of Appeals' Opinion and affirm the 
decision of the trial court* 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of March, 1988. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
American Savings & Loan 
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OCA 57-1-6 
RECORDING NECESSARY TO IMPART NOTICE - OPERATION AND EFFECT -
INTEREST OF PERSON NOT NAMED IN INSTRUMENT -
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of 
writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate 
or whereby any real estate may be affected, to operate as 
notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and 
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded 
in the office of the recorder of the county in which such 
real estate is situated, but shall be valid and binding 
between the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledg-
ment, certification or record, and as to all other persons 
who have had actual notice. Neither the fact that an instru-
ment, recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal 
consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such instru-
ment is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance other-
wise purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries 
or stating the terms of the trust, shall operate to charge 
any third person with a notice of interest of any person 
or persons not named in such instrument or the grantor or 
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser 
interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free and 
clear of all claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an 
instrument recorded as herein provided setting forth the 
names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed 
in describing the property charged with such interest. 
OCA 57-3-3 
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD -
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall 
not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as 
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any por-
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CLYDE & PRATT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, and : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DAKAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation, : CIVIL NO. C-83-2042 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : 
MARK ENGAR LISTON, et al., : 
Defendants. : 
I. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint of 
plaintiffs Diversified Equities, Inc. and Dakal, Inc. (herein-
after "Diversified" and "Dakal", respectively) to quiet title 
in plaintiffs to a duplex and lot (hereinafter "the property"), 
more particularly described as Lot 41, Tamlee Village, located 
at 7680 South 375 East, Salt Lake County, Utah. In addition, 
defendant American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter 
"American"), in plaintiffs1 original action, has filed: (1) 
a Counterclaim against plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal, alleging 
that plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers of the property 
and have been unjustly enriched a)t American's expense; (2) a 
Cross-claim against defendant Mark Engar Liston (hereinafter 
Fit O 
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"Liston"), alleging that Liston is still liable to American 
on the Note and Deed of Trust originally executed by Donald 
J. and Karen Bailey, which Liston assumed when he purchased 
the property from the Baileys; and (3) a Third-Party Complaint 
against Third Party defendant Douglas F. Rydalch (hereinafter 
"Rydalch"), alleging that Rydalch has been unjustly enriched 
at American's expense. 
II. FACTS 
The above-mentioned claims of the parties have arisen 
from an extremely complex and lengthy scenario of facts and 
events dating back to 1978. The Court has carefully reviewed 
the Transcript of Stipulation of Facts of April 19, 1984, agreed 
to by all the parties, and has examined all of the documentary 
evidence received, and considered the testimony of the witnesses. 
The Court concludes that any attempt to set forth the facts 
and events leading up to and necessary for the disposition of 
the claims of the parties would be in most part a reiteration 
of the Stipulation of Facts, and the parties should therefore 
refer to such Stipulation when necessary. In the following 
Conclusions of the Court, reference will be made, where 
appropriate, to the particular Exhibits and pages of the Trans-
cript of Stipulation relied upon by the Court. 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
The parties should bear in mind that a court of equity 
may exercise broad discretion in framing its decrees in order 
to adopt the relief granted to the circumstances of a particular 
case, and such relief should be adjusted in a manner which is 
just and equitable and affords protection to and finally 
determines the rights and claims of all parties. An equity 
court is not bound by strict or rigid legal remedies or by the 
particular pleadings setting forth the specific claims for relief 
of the parties. See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. Equity § 599, et seq.; 
27 Am.Jur.2d Equity § 102, et seq. 
As stated succinctly by the Utah Supreme Court in Travelers 
Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484, 485 (Utah 1975), "A court 
of equity can and should regard as done that which ought to 
be done; and similarly, it can and should regard as not having 
been done that which ought not to have been done." These state-
ments are consistent with Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P., which states 
in pertinent part that "every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings." 
The Court has reviewed the legal Memoranda submitted by 
the parties and conducted its own research into the numerous 
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legal questions presented and, with the foregoing statements 
regarding its equitable powers in mind, makes the following 
Conclusions concerning the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties: 
A. NEITHER DAKAL NOR DIVERSIFIED WAS A 
BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY 
The key issue as to whether Dakal and/or Diversified 
should be accorded the status of a bona fide purchaser and thus 
be entitled to prevail over American's claims against the 
property is whether Dakal and Diversified had "actual notice" 
of American's security interest in the property which was 
mistakenly released by American prior to the conveyance of the 
property from Rydalch to Dakal and Dakal to Diversified. It 
is readily apparent from Utah case law and the general weight 
of authority that "actual notice", as used in conjunction with 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 and § 57-3-3 (1953 as amended) has been 
interpreted to include implied or constructive notice. The 
Utah Supreme Court has expounded upon this interpretation of 
"actual notice" in a long line of cases dating back prior to 
statehood. Reiterating the holding of the seminal case before 
the Court in 1890, in its very recent decision of Johnson vs. 
Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983), the Court defined "actual 
notice" as follows: 
This statute was under examination by 
this Court in Toland vs. Corey, 6 Utah 
392, 24 P. 190 (1890) where we held 
that the "actual notice" required by 
§ 57-1-6 was satisfied if a party 
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dealing with the land had information 
of facts which would put a prudent man 
upon inquiry and which, if pursued, 
would lead to actual knowledge as to 
the state of the title. See a similar 
expression in McGarry vs. Thompson, 
114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948) 
[Emphasis added] 
The Utah Supreme Court has further expounded upon the 
nature of the "inquiry" required of a "prudent" man in order 
to be a bona fide purchaser. In McGarry vs. Thompson, 114 Utah 
442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948), cited by the court in Johnson vs. 
Bell, supra, the court made the following statement: 
[Wjhatever is notice enough to excite 
attention and put the party on his guard 
and call for inquiry is notice of every-
thing to which such inquiry might have 
led. When a person has sufficient 
information to lead him to a fact, he 
shall be deemed conversant of it. 
[Emphasis added] 201 P.2d at 293. 
Additionally, in Pender vs. Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 
265 P.2d 644, 649 (1954), the court held as follows: 
Moreover, the inquiry must be made at a 
reliable source from which the true 
state of facts will be naturally 
disclosed, it is not sufficient that 
the purchaser make an inquiry of a 
person when he knows that it is to 
such person's interest to misrepresent 
or conceal the existence of the out-
standing interests and that such 
person does deny its existence. 
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In applying the foregoing legal principles enunciated 
by the Utah Supreme Court to the facts and events of this case, 
the Court concludes that neither Dakal nor Diversified was a 
bona fide purchaser of the property. The Court is in substantial 
agreement with the arguments of American set forth on pages 
8-10 of its Memorandum of April 25, 1984. 
Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer 
of Dakal and Diversified, in arranging the sale of the property 
from Rydalch to Dakal (Tr. pp. 16-23). The Court also concludes 
that Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding the 
conveyances of the property from Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal 
to Diversified are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal 
and Diversified (Tr. pp. 18-22; Plaintiffs1 Exs. 5 & 6; 
Defendants1 Exs. 42 & 43; Norman vs. Murray First Thrift & Loan 
Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979), and cases cited therein). 
Consequently, in determining whether Dakal or Diversified 
should be accorded bona fide purchaser status, the "actual 
notice" (as defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson, 
McGarry, and Pender, supra) of both Pentelute and Peck are 
imputed to both Dakal and Diversified in regard to American's Trust 
Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by American. 
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The Court concludes that Pentelute and/or Peck had more 
than sufficient information to necessitate a further inquiry 
into whether Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation 
to American and whether American had made a mistake in releasing 
its Trust Deed on the property. Such an inquiry would have 
in all probability led to the discovery that neither the 
Rydalches nor anyone else had paid American and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed was in fact a mistake. Both Pentelute 
and Peck had substantial experience and dealings with distressed 
properties and real estate transactions in general, both were 
aware of the approximate market value of the property, and 
Pentelute was aware of American's interest in the property at 
the time the Rydalches acquired the property from M & W Enterprises 
through Roy Miller (Tr. pp. 16-19; Defendants1 Exs. 35, 36, 
38, 40). 
In addition, the Court finds that other facts and events 
support its conclusion that Pentelute and/or Peck knew or should 
have known that something was amiss regarding the Rydalches1 
representation of their fee simple ownership of the property. 
Such facts and events include the "distress" sale of the property 
by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or less 
of its market value (Tr. pp. 11-12, 15, 19), the $14,000.00 
finders fee paid to Pentelute by Peck compared to the purchase 
price by Dakal of $37,980.00 (Tr. pp. 19-21), and the same-day 
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transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified by Peck for 
$60,000.00 (Tr. pp. 20-21; Plaintiffs1 Exs. 2, 6). 
Therefore, the Court concludes that all of the above-
mentioned evidence, particularly when viewed as a whole, clearly 
establishes that Dakal and Diversified were not bona fide purchasers 
of the property under Utah statutory and case law. 
B. THE RYDALCHES HAVE "UNCLEAN HANDS" AND ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO FAVORABLE EQUITABLE RELIEF 
Perhaps the most important and time-honored maxim of equity 
is that one who comes before a court of equity with "unclean 
hands" is not entitled to any benefit or favorable treatment. 
Upon examining all of the evidence, this Court concludes that 
the Rydalches do have "unclean hands" by reason of their representa-
tions of fee simple ownership of the property with no security 
interest in favor of American and their conveyance of the property 
without the written or oral approval of American. 
The warranty deed conveying the property from M & W Enterprises 
to the Rydalches expressly stated that the property was subject 
to American's Trust Deed (Defendants' Ex. 38). The Buyer's 
Escrow Instructions, executed by the Rydalches, also expressly 
stated that the property was subject to American's Trust Deed 
and also subject to the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agreement 
requiring the written approval of American prior to any sale 
or transfer of the property (Defendants1 Ex. 35). The Rydalches 
also executed an Indemnification and Waiver agreement for 
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Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged that Stewart 
Title Co., the escrow and closing agent, had informed them of 
the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, and that 
the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify Stewart Title 
Co. for any consequences resulting from the failure to obtain 
written approval from American prior to the transfer of the 
property (Defendants' Ex. 37). M & W also executed a Transfer 
and Assignment of Reserve Account, which assigned and transferred 
to the Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of 
taxes and insurance on the property (Defendants' Ex. 36). Based 
upon an appraisal of the property by Academy Appraisal Associates 
(Defendants' Ex. 39), the Rydalches received a Title Insurance 
Policy from Stewart Title Co. in the amount of $103,000.00 
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy itself 
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed 
of Trust and Non-Assumption agreement (Defendants' Ex. 40). 
The closing officer at Stewart Title Co. further indicated that 
she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that the property 
was subject to American's Deed of Trust. 
Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew 
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American 
had not been paid, since they had not done so, and that American's 
release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake. 
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The Court therefore concludes that the Rydalches have 
"unclean hands" and are not entitled to favorable equitable 
relief. It is most unfortunate and the Court empathizes with 
the Rydalches that they have been the victims of an apparent 
fraud perpetrated by Roy Miller through M & W Enterprises. 
However, such action by Miller offers no legal or equitable 
justification for the actions of the Rydalches regarding their 
representations that American's interest in the property had 
been satisfied and their sale of the property to Dakal. 
C. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT -- THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES 
OF ALL THE PARTIES BEFORE THE COURT 
As the Court has concluded that Dakal and Diversified 
were not bona fide purchasers of the property, and in conjunction 
with the overall equitable remedy decided by the Court, infra, 
it is the judgment of the Court that all transactions regarding 
the transfer of the property from Dakal to Diversified are 
rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Diversified 
to the property or Dakal, respectively, are terminated. 
Title to the property is quieted in Dakal, subject to 
an equitable lien in favor of American for the amount of unpaid 
principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely the 
same payment terms of principal and interest as American's original 
Trust Deed and all other terms of said Trust Deed, with the 
specific exception that the sole obligor or trustor of American's 
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security interest shall be Dakal. Dakal shall have six months 
to bring current all arrearages for monthly payments and any 
arrearages for the reserve account to pay taxes and insurance 
on the property as of the date of this Memorandum Decision. 
All principal, interest and reserve account payments from such 
date shall be the sole obligation of Dakal. All rental payments 
from tenants paid in escrow or due shall go to Dakal. 
The Rydalches have been unjustly enriched at the expense 
of Dakal in the amount of $37,980.00, the sale price of the 
property. The closing costs of the conveyance from the Rydalches 
to Dakal shall remain as paid by Dakal. The $14,000.00 finders 
fee paid to Pentelute by Dakal or Peck was not part of the 
sale price and any cause of action between Dakal or Peck and 
Pentelute is up to those parties, as Pentelute is not a party 
to these proceedings. A Judgment by the Court is therefore 
rendered against the Rydalches and in favor of Dakal for $37,980.00. 
All rights and/or liabilities of the Rydalches relating to the 
property are terminated. 
In the opinion of the Court, Liston is the least culpable 
of all the parties now before the Court. His only liability 
could arise from his transfer of the property without obtaining 
the prior approval of American. Without ruling on the legal 
question of whether Liston may still be liable pursuant to the 
terms of American's Non-Assumption Agreement, the Court concludes 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES 
VS.. LISTON, ET AL PAGE TWELVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that it would be inequitable for Liston to remain personally 
liable in view of the Court's remedy as set forth above. Therefore, 
all rights and/or liabilities of Liston relating to the property 
or American's claims against Liston are terminated. 
The Court also empathizes with Liston and it is most 
unfortunate that he is the apparent victim of a fraud perpetrated 
by Roy Miller and/or M & W Enterprises, Herb Holtzer and Shino 
Corporation. However, none of these parties is now before the 
Court and Liston must pursue his own cause of action against 
any of them. 
All of the parties now before the Court bear some responsibility 
for the events leading up to these proceedings. Although only 
mentioned briefly by the Court, the unfortunate result of the 
entire chain of events would not have occurred except for the 
negligent and unilateral mistake of American in releasing its 
interest in the property. It is therefore the judgment of the 
Court that each party shall bear its own costs and attorney's 
fees and that American is not entitled to any late fees which 
have accrued as of the date of this Memorandum Decision. 
Counsel for American shall prepare the necessary Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order of the Court, 
including the precise amounts of all sums due and owing from 
one party to another as of the date of this Memorandum Decision, 
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and in accordance therewith. Such documents shall be submitted 
to the Court and other parties by ,7,ino ?Q IQP,4 
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MARK ENGAR LISTON; ROY L. MILLER 
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband 
and wife; BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY 
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and 
wife; each idividually; and 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee 
and not individually; and AMERICAN 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
banking corporation; BEEHIVE THRIFT 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah bank-
ing corporation; and M & W ENTER-
PRISES, allegedly a Utah general 
partnership; and JOHN DOE NUMBERS 1 
through 10 being all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon 
the real property described in the 
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs' 
ownership, or clouding their title 
thereto, 
Defendants. 




FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C83-2042 
Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge 
vs. 
I STEWART TITLE COMPANY and DOUGLAS | F. RYDALCHf 
! Third-party 
Defendants. 
| THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
j 
| J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th 
J day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been pre-
!viously dismissed therefrom, and the remaining following parties 
I being present and/or represented by their respective counsel: For 
ithe Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar 
jListon, David J. Knowlton, Esq.; for Defendant and Third-party 
;Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams 




The parties represented at the hearing having entered into 
and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all the 
parties so represented, and said parties having introduced their 
respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defen-
dant Mark Engar Liston having presented evidence, and the Court 
having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary, 
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined 
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the prem-
ises, makes the following: 
PIHDINGS OF PACT 
1. On or about January 27, 1978, Defendant and Third-party 
Plaintiff American Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter 
"American") made a loan to Donald J, and Karen H. Bailey in the 
sum of $59f200f which loan was evidenced by a Promissory Note and 
a Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust was dated January 27, 1978, 
and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 
of Book 4619 in the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office. 
2. The real property (hereinafter ••property") described in 
said Deed of Trust is located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, according to the official 
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. In October, 1980, the Baileys sold the property to 
Defendant Mark Engar Liston (sometimes hereinafter "Liston") who 
assumed the Baileys1 loan with American upon American's approval 
by executing a Mortgage Loan Assumption Agreement, a Modification 
Agreement, and a Waiver of Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment, 
4. In the documentation signed by Liston when he assumed 
the above-described loan, the Deed of Trust Non-Assumption Agree-
ment was waived specifically and exclusively for the conveyance 
from Bailey to Liston, but the Deed of Trust Non-Assuraption Agree-
ment did remain in effect as to subsequent sales. 
5. On May 14, 1982, Liston gave to M & W Enterprises a War-
ranty Deed (which was subsequently recorded) without the approval 
or knowledge of American, even though the property was still sub-
ject to American's Trust Deed. 
6. On May 28, 1982, without American's knowledge or appro-
val, M & W Enterprises sold the property to Defendant Douglas F. 
Rydalch (sometimes hereinafter "Rydalch") and his wife, Joan 
Rydalch (hereinafter referred to with Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch 
as "Rydalches"). 
7. The Warranty Deed conveying the property from M & W 
Enterprises to the Rydalches, expressly stated that the property 
was subject to American's Trust Deed. 
8. The Buyer's Escrow Instructions, executed by the 
Rydalches, also expressly stated that the property was subject to 
American's Trust Deed and also subject to the Deed of Trust 
Non-Assumption Agreement requiring the written approval of Ameri-
can prior to any sale or transfer of the property. 
9. The Rydalches also executed an Indemnification and Wai-
ver Agreement for Non-Assumption Clause in which they acknowledged 
that Stewart Title Company, the escrow and closing agent, had 
informed them of the existence of American's Non-Assumption Agree-
ment, and that the Rydalches would hold harmless and indemnify 
Stewart Title Company for any consequences resulting from the 
failure to obtain written approval from American prior to the 
transfer of the property. 
10. M & W Enterprises also executed a Transfer and Assign-
ment of Reserve Account which assigned and transferred to the 
Rydalches all amounts held by American for payment of taxes and 
insurance on the property. 
11. Based upon an appraisal of the property by Academy 
Appraisal Associates, the Rydalches received a title insurance 
policy from Stewart Title Company in the amount of $103,000. 
Schedule B of said policy clearly states that the policy, itself, 
did not insure against any loss by reason of American's Deed of 
Trust and Non-Assumption Agreement. 
12. The closing officer at Stewart Title Company further 
indicated that she very carefully explained to the Rydalches that 
the property was subject to American's Deed of Trust. 
13. American mistakenly and unilaterally released its Trust 
Deed on the property by reconveyance which was recorded on 
December 9, 1982, as Entry No. 3737849 in Book 5424, page 1731 in 
the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
14. The Trust Deed in favor of American had in fact not been 
paid and the reconveyance was erroneously given. Said Trust Deed 
continues to be unpaid. 
15. As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal 
balance owed to American under its Trust Deed is the sum of 
$56,742.92 and the arrearages under said Trust Deed (which total 
$15,886.00) consist of principal in the sura of $1,283.60, interest 
in the sum of $12,626.12 and reserve account in the sum of 
$1,956.28. 
16. On February 17, 1983, American recorded its Affidavit as 
Entry No. 3760970 in Book 5439 at page 171 in the official records 
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, indicating that 
the Trust Deed, described hereinabove, had been released by mis-
take. 
/ 17. Consequently, it is clear that the Rydalches either knew 
or certainly should have known that their obligation to American 
had not been paid since they had not done so and that American's 
\ release of its Trust Deed on the property had to be a mistake. 
18. On January 21, 1983, for the sum of $37,980, the 
Rydalches sold the subject property to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
(sometimes hereinafter "Dakal") which on the same day, sold the 
property to Plaintiff Diversified Equities, Inc. (sometimes here-
inafter "Diversified" or "Diversified Equities") for the sum of 
$60,000. 
19. Prior to the sale of the property to Dakal, Defendant 
Rydalch represented to Dakal that American's interest in the pro-
perty had been satisfied. 
20. At the time of the sale of the property from the 
Rydalches to Dakal, Wayne Peck was the President and principal 
executive officer of Dakal and Diversified. 
21• Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding 
the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch 
to Dakal, Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities, 




J 22. An individual by the name of Brad Pentelute arranged the 
t sale of the property (from the Rydalches to Dakal) in behalf of 
{ Dakal and Wayne Peck. 
! 23. Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
» 
! 
! and Wayne Peek, the President and principal executive officer of 
{Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property 
! 
j from Third-Party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
i 
! 24. Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-
! 
! cient information to necessitate a further inquiry into whether 
I Rydalch had actually satisfied the obligation to American and 
j whether American had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on 
i the property. 
! 25. Such an inquiry would have, in all probability, lead to 
j the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the 
I obligation to pay American's loan, neither the Rydalches nor 
j 
anyone else had paid American and that American's release of its 
Trust Deed was, in fact, a mistake. 
26. In addition, Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck knew or 
should have known that something was amiss regarding the 
Rydalches' representation of their fee simple ownership of the 
property. Supporting facts include the "distress" sale of the 
property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approximately one-half or 
j less of its market value, the $14,000 finder's fee paid to Brad 
|Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase price by Dakal of 
t 
i $37,980, and the same-day transfer of the property from Dakal to 
'Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000. 
27. Both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had substantial 
I experience and dealings with distressed properties and real estate 
' transactions in general, both were aware of the approximate market 
value of the property and Pentelute was aware of American's inter-
est in the property at the time the Rydalches acquired the pro-
, perty from M & W Enterprises (Pentelute had received a copy of the 
title insurance policy for the property received by the Rydalches 
at the time of their purchase which showed American's lien). 
28. The property was sold by the Rydalches to Dakal for 
approximately one-half or less of its market value. 
29. Wayne Peck paid a finder's fee in the sum of $14,000 to 
Brad Pentelute for arranging the property's purchase by Dakal. 
30. Dakal paid the closing costs of the conveyance from the 
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Rydalches to Dakal. 
31. Dakal is entitled to receive all rental payments in the 
• total sum of $325.00 from tenants of the property which have been 
. paid in escrow or are currently due. 
| CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
• 1. Brad Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had more than suffi-
i 
j cient information to necessitate a further inquiry into whether 
Rydalch had actually "satisfied" the obligation to American and 
whether American had made a mistake in releasing its Trust Deed on 
the property. 
I 2. Such an inquiry would havef in all probability, lead to 
\ the discovery that while the Rydalches, and no one else, had the 
obligation to pay American's loanr neither the Rydalches nor any-
one else had paid American and that American's release of its 
Trust Deed was in fact a mistake. 
i 
i 
; 3. In addition, the Court concludes that Brad Pentelute 
« 
:
 and/or Wayne Peck knew or should have known that something was 
; amiss regarding the Rydalches representation of their fee simple 
ownership of the property. Supporting facts include the •dis-
tress" sale of the property by the Rydalches to Dakal for approxi-
mately one-half or less of its market valuef the $14,000 finder's 
fee paid to Brad Pentelute by Wayne Peck compared to the purchase 
price by Dakal of $37,980, and the same-day transfer of the 
property from Dakal to Diversified by Wayne Peck for $60,000. 
4. Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck had "actual notice" of 
• American's security interest in the property which was mistakenly 
released by American prior to the conveyance of the property from 
Rydalch to Dakal and from Dakal to Diversified. 
5. Brad Pentelute was clearly acting as the agent of Dakal 
and Wayne Peck, the President and principal executive officer of 
; Diversified and Dakal, Inc., in arranging the sale of the property 
| from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
i 
I 6. Wayne Peck, insofar as the facts and events regarding 
the conveyances of the property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch 
to Dakal, Inc., and from Dakal, Inc., to Diversified Equities, 
Inc., are concerned, was the "alter ego" of both Dakal and Diver-
sified Equities. 
! 7. The actual notice of both Brad Pentelute and Wayne Peck 
1
 are imputed to both Dakal and Diversified Equities in regard to 
i 
'Americans Trust Deed which was mistakenly reconveyed by Ameri-
can. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and DAKAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaint iffs, 
MARK ENGAR LISTON; ROY L. MILLER 
and ELLEN GERALDINE MILLER, husband 
and wife; BARBARA VIGIL; TIMOTHY 
HART and GAYLE HART, husband and 
wife; each idividually; and 
BENJAMIN P. KNOWLTON, as trustee 
and not individually; and AMERICAN 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
banking corporation; BEEHIVE THRIFT 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah bank-
ing corporation; and M & W ENTER-
PRISES, allegedly a Utah general 
partnership; and JOHN DOE"NUMBERS 1 
through 10 being all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in, or lien upon 
the real property described in the 
pleading adverse to the Plaintiffs1 
ownership, or c1oud ing the ir title 
thereto, 
CLYDE. PRATT. 
GSBBS 8c CAHOON 
A T T O R N E Y S AT L A W 
2 0 0 AMERICAN S A V I N G S 
PLAZA 
7 7 W E S T S r C O N D S O U T H 
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JUDGMEN AND ORDER 
Case No. C83-204: 
Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick,, Judge 
vs. 




THIS CAUSE came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 19th 
day of April, 1984, various parties to the action having been pre-
viously dismissed therefrom, and the remaining following parties 
being present and/or represented by their respective counsel: For 
the Plaintiffs, Jerome H. Mooney, Esq.; for Defendant Mark Engar 
Liston, David J. Knowlton, Esq.; for Defendant and Third-party 
Plaintiff American Savings & Loan Association, H. Mifflin Williams 
III, Esq.; for Third-party Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch, Duane A. 
Burnett, Esq. 
The parties represented at the hearing having entered into 
and presented an oral stipulation of facts, agreed to by all the 
parties so represented, and said parties having introduced their 
respective documents which were admitted into evidence, and Defen-
dant Mark Engar Liston having presented evidence, and the Court 
having heard and examined the evidence, both oral and documentary, 
introduced by the respective parties hereto, and having examined 
the memoranda of counsel, and now being fully advised in the prem-
ises, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That all transactions regarding the transfer of real 
property (hereinafter "property") situated in the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, and more particularly described hereinbelow 
from Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., to Plaintiff, Diversified Equities, 
Inc., are rescinded, and all rights and/or liabilities of Plain-
tiff, Diversified Equities, Inc., to the property or Plaintiff 
Dakal, Inc., respectively, are terminated. The property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
LOT 41, TAMLEE VILLAGE, ACCORDING TO THE OFFI-
CIAL PLAT THEREOF, recorded in the office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder located in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
2. Pursuant to its original trust deed dated January 27, 
1978, and recorded as Entry No. 3059974 at page 826 in Book 4619 
of the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, Defendant, American Savings & Loan Association 
is the holder of an equitable lien upon the property for the 
amount of unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon 
precisely the same payment terms as Defendant American Savings & 
Loan's original trust deed (as set forth in this paragraph) and 
all other terms of said trust deed with the specific exception 
that the sole obligor or trustor of Defendant American Savings & 
Loan's security interest shall be Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc. 
3. That Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., owns in fee simple the real 
property situated in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and 
described hereinabove, subject to an equitable lien in favor of 
Defendant American Savings & Loan Association for the amount of 
unpaid principal and arrearages due and owing and upon precisely 
the same payment terms of principal and interest as Defendant 
American Savings & Loanfs original trust deed (dated January 27, 
1978, and recorded February 2, 1978, as Entry No. 3059974 at page 
826 in Book 4619, of the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder) and all other terms of said trust deed with the specific 
exception that the sole obligor or trustor of Defendant American 
Savings & Loan Association's security interest shall be Plaintiff 
Dakal, Inc. 
4. As of May 30, 1984, the total remaining unpaid principal 
balance owed to Defendant American Savings & Loan Association 
under its equitable lien was the sum of $56,742.92. The arrear-
ages under said equitable lien consist of principal in the sum of 
? 1 .?ai.fio t interest in the sum of $ i ? r^ ^
 9 , and reserve 
account (for taxes and insurance) in the sum of $ 1,956.28
 L 
5. That Plaintiff, Dakal, Inc., shall have six months from 
May 30, 1984, to bring current all arrearages f6r monthly payments 
and the reserve account. 
6. Defendant American Savings & Loan Association shall not 
be entitled to any late fees which have accrued as of May 30, 
1984. 
7. From May 30, 1984, all principal, interest and reserve 
account payments to Defendant American Savings & Loan Association 
CLYDE PRATT 
GIBSS ft CAHOON 
A T T O R N E Y * AT L A W 
2 0 O AMER CAN SAV N O S 
PLAZA 
77 WWT 6CCONO SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH »4IO! 
under its equitable lien shall be the sole obligation of Plaintiff 
Dakal, Inc. 
8. All renta1 payments paid by tenants of the property 
which have been paid in escrow or which are currently due in the 
sum of $325.00 shall be paid to Dakal, Inc. 
9. Third-party Defendant Douglas F. Rydalch has been 
unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff Dakal, Inc., in the 
amount of $37,980 and judgment is hereoy rendered against 
Third-party Defendant Douglas Rydalch and in favor of Plaintiff 
Dekal, Inc., for $37,980. 
10. That all rights and/or liabilities of Third-party Defen-
dant Douglas F„ Rydalch relating to the property are hereby ter-
minated. 
11. That the closing costs of the conveyance from the 
Third-party Defendart Rydalch to Plaintiff Dakal, Inc., shall 
remain as heretofore paid by Plaintiff Dakal, Inc. 
12. All rights and/or liabilities of Defendant Mark Engar 
Liston relating to the property are terminated and the claims of 
Defendant American Savings & Loan Association against Defendant 
Liston as set forth in Defendant American Savings fc Loan Associa-
tion's Counter Claim against said Defendant are hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
13. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys fees 
incurred herein. 
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Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and cor-
rect copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order to the offices 
of the following counsel this 20th day of June, 1984: 
Jerome H. Mooney, Esq. 
Arthur H. Strong, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
356 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Spencer E. Austin, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
I hereby certify that on June 20, 1984, I personally hand 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and 
Order to the offices of the following counsel: 
David J. Knowlton, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
2910 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84402 
Duane A. Burnett, Esq. 
710 West 2125 South 
Woods Cross, Utah 84087 
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Cite M 739 ?J26 1133 (UtahApp. 1987) 
for the court to dismiss with prejudice 
and prevent future consideration of the 
claims should the defect be corrected. 
The trial court abused its discretion by 
entering its Rule 41(b) dismissal with 
prejudice. 
Id. at 1020. 
[3] In this case we believe the court 
abused its discretion in not allowing the 
amendment or granting a continuance. 
Defendant claimed no surprise, nor could 
it, but instead relied on the specter of in-
creased costs and complexity if the amend-
ment was granted. Despite the parties be-
ing represented by the same counsel 
throughout the proceedings and despite 
there being no surprise, the dismissal with 
prejudice was granted. While courts are 
given great latitude and discretion in the 
application of the law, they still must have 
sufficient grounds to apply the "harsh and 
permanent remedy" of a dismissal with 
prejudice. No such grounds appear here. 
The dismissal with prejudice and the 
judgment are reversed and the case is re-
manded for trial. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
tion. Ru^e 19(a) instructs the trial 
rt to join as a party a person whose 
00
 c e will prevent complete relief among 
*
 e already parties. A plain reading of 
les l?(a) a n ^ ^(a) r e v e a ^ s t n a t t n e t r ^ 
rt should make every effort to insure 
°h t the proceeding adjudicates the rights 
/ those necessary and intended to be be-
°t pp the court. In conjunction with this 
•c concept is the requirement in Utah 
R CJV.P. ^ ^ wn*cn s t a tes t n a t leave shall 
' freely given to amend a pleading when 
• stice so requires. This admonition is giv-
n in the sentence which declares that sub-
equent amendments to pleadings may be 
made only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party. 
[2] Defendant cannot claim that it was 
not aware of plaintiffs status as a partner-
ship as early as nine months prior to the 
o^ al. During the taking of depositions in 
August of 1983, defendant's counsel was 
informed that plaintiff was a partnership. 
Plaintiffs status was also revealed to de-
fendant both by the Stipulation and Order 
Amend mailed to counsel and at the 
pre-trial settlement conference.1 
The issue of dismissing an action with 
prejudice was recently addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Bonneville Tower 
v. Thompson Michie Assoc, 728 P.2d 1017 
(Utah 1986). The trial court's dismissal for 
failure to join indispensable parties was 
affirmed but the Supreme Court remanded 
with the instruction to enter the dismissal 
without prejudice. That Court wrote: 
While the court below properly exercised 
its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs ac-
tion for failing to comply with Rule 19(a), 
it was improper to do so with prejudice. 
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 
41(b) is a harsh and permanent remedy 
when it precludes a presentation of a 
plaintiffs claims on their merits. Our 
niles of procedure are intended to en-
courage the adjudication of disputes on 
their merits. 
| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 3> 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and Dakal, Inc., a Utah 
corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 860287-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 22, 1987. 
N
°t having considered the merits of Action was brought to quiet title to 
Plaintiffs claims, there was no reason property. The District Court, Salt Lake 
At trial, counsel for defendant admitted re-
^ n g the request to stipulate to the filing of 
the Second Amended Complaint but stated that 
he was unwilling to so stipulate. 
1134 Utah 739 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., quieted 
title in subsequent purchasers subject to 
equitable lien in favor of holder of trust 
deed. Appeal was taken. The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J., held that unrecorded 
conveyance was void as against subsequent 
purchasers. 
Reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions. 
1. Vendor and Purchaser <£=*229(2) 
For unrecorded conveyance to be void 
as against any subsequent purchaser in 
good faith and for valuable consideration, 
subsequent purchaser must show he had no 
actual notice, i.e., no personal knowledge of 
prior conveyance or that prior conveyance 
did not impart constructive notice or that 
prior conveyance was not recorded before 
his conveyance in same land was recorded. 
U.C.A.1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3. 
2. Vendor and Purchaser <3=*229(2) 
If a subsequent purchaser has infor-
mation or facts which would put prudent 
person upon inquiry which, if pursued, 
would lead to actual knowledge as to state 
of title, unrecorded conveyance is not void 
as against subsequent purchaser. U.C.A. 
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3. 
3. Vendor and Purchaser <s=>229(2) 
Unrecorded conveyance was void as 
against subsequent purchasers, although 
mortgage broker and principal of subse-
quent purchasers had sufficient informa-
tion to necessitate further inquiry on status 
of trust deed; broker and principal acted 
with sufficient diligence to meet duty im-
posed by doctrine of inquiry notice by hav-
ing title search performed and personally 
contacting trust deed holder which mistak-
enly stated that loan was paid off. U.C.A. 
1953, 57-1-6, 57-3-3. 
Jerome H. Mooney, Arthur M. Strong, 
Mooney & Smith, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
Ted Boyer, H. Mifflin Williams III, 
Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs & Cahoon, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and respondent. 




Appellants Diversified Equities I 
versified) and Dakal, Inc. (Dakal) K 
an action to quiet title to a duplex a U^1 
in Salt Lake County. Respondent A 
can Savings and Loan (American) hj^ 
recorded security interest in the pro * 
which was released prior to the conve ^ 
es to Diversified and Dakal. The 1 * 
court quieted title in Dakal, subject to ^ 
equitable lien in favor of American equal^  
the principal amount owing on the n 
secured by American's previous trust deed 
Dakal seeks reversal of the lower court/ 
judgment and an order that Dakal owm 
the property in fee simple, free of any 
interest in American. Diversified, which 
bought the property from Dakal, seeks re-
versal of the judgment below and an order 
upholding its rights against Dakal in the 
property. We reverse. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
So far as is relevant for this appet], 
which concerns only the rights of Dak-
al/Diversified and American inter se, the 
dispute was submitted to the lower court 
on a detailed stipulation of facts read into 
the record by counsel. Although there are 
several transactions, the key facts are rela-
tively simple. 
On January 2, 1978, American loaned the 
Baileys $59,200, which was secured by i 
trust deed to the property in question. The 
trust deed was recorded in February 1978. 
The property was then sold in 1980 to 
Liston, then on May 14, 1982 by Liston to 
M & W Enterprises. Although M & W did 
not pay cash, Liston parted with title to the 
property. M & W's future obligation* 
were not secured by the subject property 
but instead Liston was given a trust deed 
in other property, which proved to be 
worthless as security. M & W sold the 
subject property to Rydalch on May & 
1982, as the first part of a contempt 
exchange transaction. The property ** 
DIVERSIFIED EQUITIES v. AMER. SAV. 
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bject to American's original trust 
to 
Milter 
S\A "and the deed to Rydalch so recited, as 
^various closing papers. 
order to purchase the property from 
ln
 yf Rydalch borrowed $18,000 from 
who took in return a note for $19,-
\I & W's principal, Miller, promised 
pay Holzer within 30 days. Instead, 
l
 r skipped town. Rydalch then at-
"oted to sell the property to raise the 
ev to repay the note to Holzer and had 
m
° attorney, Burnett, investigate the liens 
the property. Burnett learned from an-
°ther financial institution that its trust 
0
 A
 0f record had actually been dis-
charged and he secured a reconveyance. 
Rydalch and Burnett then called American 
total of three times and, while the first 
call was inconclusive, were told each of the 
other times that the loan to the Baileys had 
been repaid. Rydalch apparently chose not 
w be too curious about who his benefactor 
might be. 
Prompted by the telephone calls, Ameri-
can executed and recorded a reconveyance 
in early December 1982. American subse-
quently discovered that the loan had not 
been paid and that there was a balance due 
in excess of $55,000. Apparently American 
erred because the Baileys had some thirty-
four loans with American, and American's 
records were somewhat confused. The tri-
al court concluded that American was neg-
ligent in reconveying the property.1 
Meanwhile, Holzer began threatening 
Rydalch that he and his family would sus-
tain bodily harm if the amount due him was 
not paid. Although Holzer had received a 
trust deed to the duplex property, he want-
ed cash. Rydalch then responded to an ad 
placed by Pentelute, a self-described mort-
gage broker specializing in distressed 
**les. Pentelute spoke to Rydalch, Ry-
dalch's attorney Burnett, and American, 
*nd received confirmation all around that 
I. The reconveyance gives every appearance of 
<*ing the product of a deliberate—and delibera-
|«*-*ct The "Full Reconveyance" was signed 
*y one officer and attested by another. It recit-
ed that written instructions to reconvey had 
«*n received from the beneficiarv anrl tK„ *u-
note secured by the trust deed had been ore t 
ed for endorsement. It additionally recttedTh 
American's trust deed had been satisfied. 
Pentelute was furnished a copy of the re-
conveyance. Pentelute then contacted 
Wayne Peck, a principal in both Dakal and 
Diversified, who agreed to purchase the 
property. Pentelute ordered a title search, 
which disclosed nothing unexpected except 
a lis pendens recorded in September 1982 
on behalf of Liston. To facilitate the sale 
which would raise his repayment, on Janu-
ary 21, 1983, Holzer obtained a release of 
the lis pendens, albeit with a bad check, 
and the sale from Rydalch to Dakal was 
closed later that day. 
Dakal paid $38,260 for the property and 
paid Pentelute a $14,000 finder's fee. Dak-
al immediately recorded its warranty deed 
and sold the property to Diversified for 
$60,000. A month later American, having 
discovered its mistake, recorded an affida-
vit stating that it had released the trust 
deed in error and that the trust deed was 
still in effect. 
On these facts,2 the trial court held that 
Diversified and Dakal were not bona fide 
purchasers of the property. It concluded 
that Pentelute and/or Wayne Peck had 
more than sufficient information to necessi-
tate yet further inquiry into whether Ry-
dalch or any one else had actually satisfied 
the obligation to American and whether 
American had made a mistake in releasing 
its trust deed on the property. The trial 
court cited the following facts as imposing 
upon Pentelute and Peck a duty of further 
inquiry: the reference to American's lien in 
Rydalch's deed; the sale of the property by 
Rydalch to Dakal for approximately one-
half or less of its market value; the $14,-
000 finder's fee paid to Pentelute compared 
to the purchase price of some $38,000; and 
the same-day transfer of the property from 
Dakal to Diversified. The trial court qui-
eted title in Dakal, subject to an equitable 
lien in favor of American. 
the reconveyance was executed by authority of a 
resolution of American's board of directors. 
2. Significantly, the stipulated facts include noth-
ing inconsistent with the conclusion that the 
dealings of Rydalch and Dakal, through the bro-
ker Pentelute, were at arm's length. 
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The issue on appeal is whether there was 
sufficient notice of a "lien" on the property 
to require a duty of further inquiry by 
Dakal. If there was, Dakal was not a bona 
fide purchaser and took the property sub-
ject to American's "lien." 3 
NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
[1] Under our recording statute, an 
unrecorded conveyance is "void as against 
any subsequent purchaser in good faith 
and for valuable consideration of the same 
real estate . . . where his own conveyance 
shall be first duly recorded." Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-3-3 (1986). However, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), unrecord-
ed documents affecting real property are 
enforceable as against persons with "actual 
notice." Thus, "[a] subsequent purchaser 
must . . . show that he had no actual notice, 
i.e., no personal knowledge, of a prior con-
veyance or that the prior conveyance did 
not impart constructive notice, i.e., was not 
recorded before his conveyance in the same 
land was recorded." Utah Farm Prod. 
Credit Ass'n. v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 
904, 906 n. 2 (Utah 1987). Wayne Peck and 
Pentelute obviously did not have construc-
tive or record notice because American had 
mistakenly released its trust deed and re-
corded its reconveyance before they dealt 
with the property. 
[2] As for the "actual notice" exception 
of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), the 
stipulated facts make clear Peck and Pente-
lute did not have actual knowledge of 
American's interest. However, the excep-
tion is also triggered if a party dealing with 
the land has information or facts which 
would put a prudent person upon an in-
quiry which, if pursued, would lead to actu-
al knowledge as to the state of the title. 
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 
3. For purposes of this appeal, we employ the 
parties' logic that the legal effect of an improvi-
dently recorded reconveyance is to leave the 
lien created by the trust deed in legal existence, 
albeit unrecorded. We are not asked to decide 
whether reconveyance has the legal effect of 
actually terminating the lien created by a trust 
deed and rendering the accompanying note, if it 
has not been repaid, unsecured. 
1983). Whether a party should be
 Cn 
with "actual notice," either in the sen ^ 
having actual knowledge or being"
 A °* 
quiry notice, turns on questions of f 
See id. The trial court "found" that P ^ 
and Pentelute were chargeable with " 
al notice." 
EFFECT OF STIPULATED FACTS 
Generally, a trial court's findings of f 
are accorded great deference. Howev 
without regard to the labels used, wh ' 
those "findings" proceed from stipulated 
facts, as in the instant case, the "finding" 
are tantamount to conclusions of law with 
the stipulation of facts being the functional 
equivalent of true findings of fact. Se 
Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala 
1980). See also City of Spencer v. Hawk-
eye Security Ins. Co., 2Yt) ^.^.Sa 406,408 
(Iowa 1974) ("Where the facts are not in 
material dispute, interpretation placed 
thereon by trial court becomes a question 
of law which is not conclusive on appeal.")-
Schroeder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 
(Mo. 1979) (only issue on appeal was wheth-
er trial court drew the proper legal conclu-
sions from the stipulated facts). On ap-
peal, this court reviews conclusions of law 
for legal correctness. Copper State Thrift 
& Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
App.1987). See Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
[3] After a careful review of the stipu-
lated facts, we cannot agree with the lower 
court's conclusion of law that Pentelute 
and Peck (as opposed to Rydalch, who 
clearly lenew better) had sufficient mlorma-
tion to necessitate further inquiry into the 
status of American's trust deed.4 
4. The previously identified specific factors re-
lied on by the court in support of its conclusion 
that Pentelute and Peck were not bona fide 
purchasers do not tilt toward that result. Refa-
ence in Rydalch's deed to American's interest 
was meaningless in the face of American's sub-
sequent reconveyance. A distress sale well be-
low market price can be prompted by numerous 
factors. Indeed, it was stated in the stipulauoo 
of facts that Rydalch would testify he agreed w 
sell so cheaply because he could not secure 1 
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\\Thile the circumstances were suspicious 
and called for inquiry, Pentelute, acting for 
peck, inquired—and with sufficient dil-
.
 enCe to meet the duty imposed by the 
doctrine of inquiry notice. He had a title 
search performed and he personally con-
tacted American even though the results of 
jtydalch's and Burnett's three prior con-
tacts were accurately—if disingenuously— 
communicated to him and even though he 
had a copy of the reconveyance. American 
confirmed what the title search, the recon-
veyance, Burnett, and Rydalch all told him. 
Wayne Peck, acting for Dakal and Diversi-
fied, reasonably relied on the title search 
and the clear evidence, both documentary 
and verbal, of American's reconveyance.5 
American negligently released its trust 
deed, and its security interest will not be 
preserved against bona fide third party 
purchasers who, at least on the facts as 
loan since the duplex was not owner-occupied 
and because of the lis pendens against the prop-
erty. In addition, it was actually stipulated that 
Rydalch was under extreme pressure because of 
Hoizer's threats of violence and because of the 
imminency of a trustee's sale noticed by Holzer. 
A hefty finder's fee is to be expected where a 
free-lance broker finds a property which can be 
had for a comparative song. A same-day trans-
fer from one related entity to another might be 
effected for a number of tax or business rea-
sons. In this case, Diversified was a group of 
investors put together by Peck but who, unlike 
Peck, apparently had no interest in Dakal. The 
back-to-back sales left the Diversified sharehold-
ers with a property worth more than they had to 
pay for it, while netting Dakal, in which Peck 
apparently had a greater interest, $8,000.00 
profit. 
5. A duty of inquiry requires the party to make 
inquiry and to diligently do that which the an-
stipulated, were bona fide purchasers with-
out notice and without further duty to in-
quire. To hold otherwise would defeat the 
purpose of the recording statutes and sub-
vert the sound commercial policy they pro-
mote. 
We reverse and remand with instructions 
to quiet title to Dakal and/or Diversified, 
as their interests may appear, as against 
American. Each party shall bear its own 
costs of appeal. 
JACKSON and BENCH, JJ., concur. 
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*> 
swer to the inquiry reasonably prompts. Pente-
lute's inquiry elicited an answer which was con-
sistent with the reconveyance document he had 
seen, the title report, and Rydalch's and Bur-
nett's reports about what they were told. It 
would stretch the notion of inquiry notice be-
yond the breaking point to hold that the answer 
Pentelute received to his inquiry of American 
should have prompted him to go further. What 
would he have done? Demand to see receipts, 
instructions for reconveyance from the benefi-
ciary to the trustee, or the chairman of Ameri-
can's board? He obviously had some concern 
or, with a reconveyance regular on its face in 
hand, there would be no reason to call Ameri-
can for verbal confirmation of the fact of recon-
veyance. But a duty to inquire is not a duty to 
disbelieve, aggressively investigate, and set 
straight. See also Note 1, supra. 
